translation draft

この論旨は、神が人間を、真に自由だが同時にいつも正しく行動することが保証されるように作ったと言うことに、矛盾がないと主張する人々によって挑戦されてきた。そのうちの一つを引用すると：

人間が一度、または複数の機会に良さを自由に選ぶことが論理的に不可能ではないなら、あらゆる機会に良さを自由に選ぶことは論理的に不可能ではない。それなら、神は罪のない自動人形を作ることと、自由に行動するので時々間違ってしまう存在を作ることとの間の選択に直面していなかった。自由に行動するが、常に正しい方向に進む存在を作るという、明らかにより良い可能性が開かれていた。明らかに、この可能性を利用することができなかったことは、彼が全能であり、完全に善良であることと矛盾するのである。

この主張は、かなりの力を持っている。しかし、それに応じて、自由意志反論の修正された形が提案されている。自由行動というのが、外部から強制されず、主体が自分自身を見つけ出す状況に反応するとき主体の性質から流れ出ることを意味する場合、私たちが自由に存在することと、私たちの行動が「（私たち自身の、神から与えられた性質によって）引き起こされ」、したがって原理的に予測可能であることとの間には、実は矛盾がない。しかし、神が私たちの行動の原因であり、私たちが特に神との関係において自由な存在であるということには矛盾があることが示唆されている。矛盾は、神が私たちをそのように作ったので、私たちは必然的に特定の方向に行動するという立場と、私たちが神との関係において真に独立した人間であるという立場をとることの間にある。もし我々のすべての思考や行動が神に定められていれば、私たちが自分自身に自由であり責任があるように見えても、神の目には自由も責任も持っていない、代わりに神の人形に過ぎないのである。このような「自由」は、一連の催眠術の後の提案を行う患者のそれと似ている。彼らは自分自身に自由であるように見えるが、その意志は、実際は催眠術師の意思によって決定され、患者は彼との関係によって真に自由な主体ではできない。したがって、神が人間人形よりも息子と娘を創造しようとしているのであれば、神がこのような[真に自由ではない]存在を作ったかもしれないが、そうすることは何の意味もないことを示唆されている。

アウグスティヌス的神義論

悪の問題への主要な伝統的なキリスト教的反応は、聖アウグスティヌス（354-430 A.D.）によって形成され、近ごろ多くの批判を受けてきたが、何世紀にもわたってキリスト教的心の大多数の記錄を構成してきた。それには哲学と神学の両方が含まれている。主な哲学的立場は、悪の否定的または欠乏的な本質という考えである。アウグスティヌスは、宇宙が善なるというヘブル・キリスト的信念をしっかりとしている。つまり、それは善なる神の良い目的のための創造物である。アウグスティヌスによれば、より高い、低い、大きい、小さい良さが非常に豊富で多様にある。しかし、存在しているすべてのことは、自分の方法と程度において良いだが、損なわれたり堕落したりしたのはそうではない。それ故、邪悪な意志や、痛みの例や、自然界の何らかの不調和や崩壊や、悪は神によってそこに置かれたのではなく、本質的には良いが間違っていることを示す。アウグスティヌスは失明の例を引く。失明は「物」ではない。唯一の関連物は目で、それ自体としては良いのである。失明の悪は、目の適切な機能の欠如から成る。原理を一般化すると、アウグスティヌスは、悪が常にそれ自体としては良い何かの誤動作から成っていると主張する。

宇宙は、もともと神の手から出てきたので、創造的な聖なる意図を表す完璧な調和だった。それは、高い、低い形の存在の階級的な階層構造であり、それそれは自らな位置で良いのである。そうなら、どのようにして悪が起こったのか？それは、自由意志を伴う宇宙の階層で最初に出てきた。この自由意志は天使と人間の物であった。天使の一部は、神である最善から、より小さな善に転じ、彼らの創造主に対して反逆して、結局は最初の男女が堕落するように誘惑した。この天使と人間の堕落は、道徳的な悪や罪の起源だったのである。人類が地上の守り手で意図されておるので、病気、「歯と爪を赤く染めている自然」、地震、嵐などの自然の悪は、罪の刑罰の結果であり、この人間の義務を従わないことがすべての自然をずれたのである。こうしてアウグスティヌスは、「すべての悪は、罪あるいは罪の罰である」と言うことができた。

アウグスティヌスの神義論は、歴史の終わりに審判が下され、あの時多くの人が永遠の命に入り、（神の救いの申し出を彼らの自由で拒否した）多くの人々は永遠の苦しみに入ると付け加える。アウグスティヌスにとって、「罪を犯さない人には幸せがあるため、宇宙は完全である。そして、罪人に惨めさがあるため、完璧は足りなくない。。。罪の罰は、罪の不名誉を正す。」彼はここで、正当に処罰された罪は清算されて、神の宇宙の完全性を傷つけないという道徳的バランスの原理を呼び出している。

アウグスティヌスの神義論は、創造物に責めを余すところなく負わせて、創作者に悪の存在の一切の責任も問わないという、その裏にある意図を満たす。悪は、人類の先史時代に行われた宇宙的に重要な悲劇的な行動への、創造物の自由の責められるべき誤用から出てきたのである。その行動は、天使の一部の理解できない堕落によって予見され、その首長が今日の神の敵、サタンである。

have to be fixed on several points..

original text

CHAPTER 4
The Problem Of Evil
THE PROBLEM
For many people it is, more than anything else, the appalling depth and extent of human suffering, together with the selfishness and greed which produce so much of this, that makes the idea of a loving Creator seem implausible and disposes them toward one of the various naturalistic theories of religion.
Rather than attempt to define “evil” in terms of some theological theory (for example, as “that which is contrary to God’s will”), it seems better to define it ostensively, by indicating that to which the word refers. It refers to physical pain, mental suffering, and moral wickedness. The last is one of the causes of the first two, for an enormous amount of human pain arises from people’s inhumanity. This pain includes such major scourges as poverty, oppression and persecution, war, and all the injustice, indignity, and inequity that have occurred throughout history. Even disease is fostered, to an extent that has not yet been precisely determined by psychosomatic medicine, by emotional and moral factors seated both in individuals and in their social environment. However, although a great deal of pain and suffering are caused by human action, there is yet more that arises from such natural causes as bacteria and earthquakes, storm, fire, lightning, flood, and drought. As a challenge to theism, the problem of evil has traditionally been posed in the form of a dilemma: if God is perfectly loving, God must wish to abolish
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The Problem of Evil
all evil; and if God is all-powerful, God must be able to abolish all evil. But evil exists; therefore God cannot be both omnipotent and perfectly loving.
One possible solution (offered, for example, by contemporary Christian Science) canberuledoutimmediately so faras the traditional Judaic-Christian faith is concerned. To say that evil is an illusion of the human mind is impossible within a religion based upon the stark realism of the Bible. Its pages faithfully reflect the characteristic mixture of good and evil in human experience. They record every kind of sorrow and suffering, every mode of “man’s inhumanity to man” and of our painfully insecure existence in the world. There is no attempt to regard evil as anything but dark, menacingly ugly, heartrending, and crushing. There can be no doubt, then, that for biblical faith evil is entirely real and in no sense an illusion.
There are three main Christian responses to the problem of evil: the Augustinian response, hinging upon the concept of the fall of man from an original state of righteousness, the Irenaean response, hinging upon the idea of the gradual creation of a perfected humanity through life in a highly imperfect world; and the response of modern process theology, hinging upon the idea of a God who is not all-powerful and not in fact able to prevent the evils arising either in human beings or in the processes of nature.
Before examining each of these three responses, or theodicies, we will discuss a position that is common to all of them.
The common ground is some form of what has come to be called the free-will defense, at least so far as the moral evil of human wickedness is concerned, for Christian thought has always seen moral evil as related to human freedom and responsibility. To be a person is to be a finite center of freedom, a (relatively) self-directing agent responsible for one’s own decisions. This involves being free to act wrongly as well as rightly. There can therefore be no certainty in advance that a genuinely free moral agent will never choose amiss. Consequently, according to the strong form of free-will defense, the possibility of wrongdoing is logically inseparable from the creation of finite persons, and to say that God should not have created beings who might sin amounts to saying that God should not have created people.
This thesis has been challenged by those who claim that no contradiction is involved in saying that God might have made people who would be genuinely free but who could at the same time be guaranteed always to act rightly. To quote from one of these:
If there is no logical impossibility in a man’s freely choosing the good on one, or on several occasions, there cannot be a logical impossibility in his freely choosing the good on every occasion. God was not, then, faced with a choice between making innocent automata and making beings who, in acting freely, would sometimes go wrong: there
‘Theodicy,” formed (by Leibniz) from the Greek theos, god, and dike, righteous, is a technical term for attempts to solve the theological problem of evil.
The Problem of Evil 41
was open to him the obviously better possibility of making beings who would act freely but always goright. Clearly, his failure to avail himself of this possibility is inconsistent with his being both omnipotent and wholly good.’
This argument has considerable power. A modified form of free-will defense has, however, been suggested in response to it. If by free actions we mean actions that are not externally compelled, but flow from the nature of agents as they react to the circumstances in which they find themselves, then there is indeed no contradiction between our being free and our actions’ being ‘caused” (by our own God-given nature) and thus being in principle predictable. However, it is suggested, there is a contradiction in saying that God is the cause of our acting as we do and that we are free beings specifically in relation to God. The contradiction is between holding that God has so made us that we shall of necessity act in a certain way, and that we are genuinely independent persons in relation to God. If all our thoughts and actions are divinely predestined, then however free and responsible we may seem to ourselves to be, we are not free and responsible in the sight of God but must instead be God’s puppets. Such “freedom” would be comparable to that of patients acting out a series of posthypnotic suggestions: they appear to themselves to be free, but their volitions have actually been predetermined by the will of the hypnotist, in relation to whom the patients are therefore not genuinely free agents. Thus, it is suggested, while God could have created such beings, there would have been no point in doing so-at least not if God is seeking to create sons and daughters rather than human puppets.
THE AUGUSTINIAN THEODICY
The main traditional Christian response to the problem of evil was formulated by St. Augustine (354–430 A.D.) and has constituted the majority report of the Christian mind through the centuries, although it has been much criticized in recent times. It includes both philosophical and theological strands. The main philosophical position is the idea of the negative or privative nature of evil. Augustine holds firmly to the Hebrew-Christian conviction that the universe is good-that is to say, it is the creation of a good God for a good purpose. There are, according to Augustine, higher and lower, greater and lesser goods in immense abundance and variety; however, everything that has being is good in its own way and degree, except insofar as it has become spoiled or
L. Mackie, “Eviland Omnipotence,” Mind (April 1955), p. 209. A similar pointis made by Antony
Flew in “Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom,” New Essays in Philosophical Theology. An
important critical comment on these arguments is offered by Ninian Smart in “Omnipotence, Evil
and Supermen,” Philosophy (April 1961), with replies by Flew (January 1962) and Mackie (April
荔 also Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing o 1977).
The Problem of Evil
corrupted. Evil-whether it be an evil will, an instance of pain, or some disorder or decay in nature-has therefore not been set there by God but represents the going wrong of something that is inherently good. Augustine points to blindness as an example. Blindness is not a “thing.” The only thing involved is the eye, which is in itself good; the evil of blindness consists of the lack of a proper functioning of the eye. Generalizing the principle, Augustine holds that evil always consists of the malfunctioning of something that is in itself good.
As it originally came forth from the hand of God, then, the universe was a perfect harmony expressing the creative divine intention. It was a graded hierarchy of higher and lowerforms of being, each good in its own place. How, then, did evil come about? It came about initially in those levels of the universe that involve free will: the free will of the angels and of human beings. Some of the angels turned from the supreme Good, which is God, to lesser goods, thereby rebelling against their creator, they in turn tempted the first man and woman to fall. This fall of angelic and human beings was the origin of moral evil or sin. The natural evils of disease, of “nature red in tooth and claw,” and of earthquake, storm, and so on are the penal consequences of sin, for humanity was intended to be guardian of the earth, and this human defection has set all nature awry. Thus Augustine could say, “All evil is either sin or the punishment for sin.”*
The Augustinian theodicy adds that at the end of history there will come the judgment, when many will enter into eternal life and many others (who in their freedom have rejected God’s offer of salvation) into eternal torment. For Augustine, “since there is happiness for those who do not sin, the universe is perfect; and it is no less perfect because there is misery for sinners…the penalty of sin corrects the dishonour of sin.” He is invoking here a principle of moral balance according to which sin that is justly punished is thereby cancelled out and no longer regarded as marring the perfection of God’s Url WerSe.
The Augustinian theodicy fulfills the intention lying behind it, which is to clear the creator of any responsibility for the existence of evil by loading that responsibility without remainder upon the creature. Evil stems from the culpable misuse of creaturely freedom in a tragic act, of cosmic significance, in the prehistory of the human race-an act that was prefigured in the heavenly realms by the incomprehensible fall of some of the angels, the chief of whom is now Satan, God’s Enemy.
This theodicy has been criticized in the modern period, the first major critic
being the great German Protestant theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher (17681834).
*De Genesi Ad Litteram, Imperfectus liber, 1.3. “On Free Will, III, ix. 26.
See Schleiermacher’s The Christian Faith, Second Part, “Explication of the Consciousness of Sin.”